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M.: Property--Joint Tenancy--Rights of Survivorship

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
PRoPERTn-Joirr TENANcy-icais oF SuIIvomsm,.-Grantor
conveyed certain real property to AB, C and E. By the deed, A
and B as husband and wife took a one-half undivided interest as
tenants by the entirety, while C and E took undivided one-fourth
interests respectively. The deed specifically stated that upon the
death of any grantee, his or her share would vest in the survivors,
except that the interest of A and B should first vest in the surviving
spouse and upon the death of both, vest in the other survivors. A,
the husband, died survived by his wife B, later E died and P, her
daughter, seeks partition of the land as the administratix of E's
estate. P contended that a valid joint tenancy must have unity of
time, title, interest and possession, and since A and B had a onehalf interest as compared to the one-fourth interests of C and E,
that the unity of interest had not been fulfilled, and the result is a
tenancy in common with no rights of survivorship in E's interest
in the land. Held, sustaining the lower court's ruling, that by statute
in Florida, grantees may take as tenants in common with such
rights of survivorship as are expressly provided for in the deed of
conveyance. Even though the grant does not comply with the
common law rule of equality of interest, the express provision for
rights of survivorship is valid. Winchester v. Wells, 265 F.2d 405
(5th Cir. 1959).
'This case exemplifies a rather extreme erasure of the original
incidents to a common law estate of joint tenancy. At common law
an estate in joint tenancy was created when the grantor or testator
conveyed or devised to two or more persons lands or tenements to
hold in accordance with the limitations of such an estate, whether
in fee, for life, at will or for years. 2 MINoR, REAL P.RoPERTY § 837
(2d ed. 1928). Such an estate in joint tenancy derived its properties from the unities necessary to its formation. These unities were
fourfold: unity of time, unity of title, unity of interest, and unity
of possession. The requisite unities necessitated that every joint
tenant receive his respective interest at the same time, that title was
derived from one act, that the estates granted be of the same interest, that is to say all were in fee, for life or whatever the limitation
may have been, and that each had an undivided interest in the
entire estate, so that each could hold every part of the whole as if it
were his own, yet not to the exclusion or detriment of any other
joint tenant 2 MiNoii, REAL PROPERTY §§ 839-843 (2d ed. 1928).
At common law there was a presumption of the creation of a
joint tenancy when land was conveyed or devised to two or more
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persons other than a husband and wife. To create a tenancy in
common, it was necessary that the creating instrument state specifically that the estate given was a tenancy in common. 2 MiNoR,
REAL PIoPERTY § 838 (2d ed. 1928).
One of the main differences between a joint tenancy and a tenancy in common was that a joint tenancy carried with it rights of
survivorship, while the estates of tenants in common were inheritable. This right of survivorship and to what extent it is attendant
to an estate of joint tenancy today is the essence of the decision in
the principal case.
The right of survivorship incumbent upon common law joint
tenancies has been eliminated in the majority of jurisdictions in the
United States today. 4 THoMsoN, REAL NoPERTY § 1786 (perm.
ed. 1940). In Florida, the situs of the principal case, the statute
provides:
"The doctrine of right of survivorship in cases of real estate
and personal property held by joint tenants shall not prevail
in this state; that is to say, except in case of estates by entirety,
a devise, transfer or conveyance heretofor or hereafter made to
two or more shall create a tenancy in common unless the instrument creating the estate shall provide for the right of survivorship; and in cases of estates by entirety, the tenants upon
divorce shall become tenants in common." FA. STAT. ANw.
§ 689.15 (1944).
In applying this statute to the principal case, the court held that
the several grantees of a deed could take as tenants in common
with such rights of survivorship as were provided for in the deed.
Such an interpretation of this statute permits the effect of a common law joint tenancy, at least as to the incident of survivorship,
while eliminating the necessity of the four unities which were
mandatory at common law.
The West Virginia law on this subject presents an interesting
comparison. In this jurisdiction, as in Florida, the rights of survivorship attendant to common law estates have been altered by statute.
W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 19 (Michie 1955) provides:
"When any joint tenant or tenant by the entireties of an interest
in real or personal property, whether such interest be a present
interest, or by way of reversion or remainder or other future
interest shall die, his share shall descend or be disposed of as
if he had been a tenant in common."
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W. VA. CODE, ch. 36, art. 1, § 20 (Michie 1955) provides:
"The preceding section shall not apply to any estate which joint
tenants have as executors or trustees, nor to an estate conveyed
or devised to persons in their own right, when it manifestly
appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was intended
that the part of the one dying should then belong to the others.
Neither shall it affect the mode of the proceeding on any joint
judgment or decree in favor of, or on any contract with two
or more, one of whom dies."
The net effect of the two above cited sections of the code would
seem to bring about a somewhat different result than the conclusion reached under the Florida statute in the principal case. Section 19, supra, does not abolish common law joint tenancies, but it
does destroy the right of survivorship as an incident of a joint tenancy. Section 20, supra, provides that section 19 does not apply
when it is manifest from the creating instrument that the right of
survivorship was clearly intended. Although no particular words
are necessary to create a joint tenancy, the use of the words "as
joint tenants" is not enough. The right of survivorship must be
clearly spelled out in the creating instrument. Wallace v. Wallace,
168 Va. 216, 190 S.E. 293 (1937). The combined effect of these
two section, insofar as joint tenancies are concerned, seems to be
that the common law joint tenancy is still in effect in this jurisdiction if the right of survivorship is clearly provided for in the creating instrument.
In Neal v. Hamilton, 70 W. Va. 250, 262, 73 S.E. 971 (1912),
the court seems to have defined clearly the effect of a creating
instrument wherein survivorship is provided. The West Virginia
court concluded in that case by saying:
"True in this state as in Virginia the right of survivorship at
common law is abolished by statute, but this is not so, if the
deed, or as here, the will, expressly limits the estate granted
to the survivor. When so limited the grantees or the devisees
take joint estates only, subject to all the limitations attaching
to such estate at common law."
From what has been said in the latter case, it is evident that the
unities required for a valid joint tenancy at common law are still
required for such an estate under the West Virginia statute.
Interpreting the above quoted language of the court, it might well
be argued further that a limitation to the survivor is valid only
when the requisites for the common law joint tenancy are met.
Thus, no other estate may successfully employ such a limitation in
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this jurisdiction. Bights of survivorship are also attendant to tenancies by entirety, but in view of the recent case of Wartenburg v.
Wartenburg, 100 S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 1957), it is presumed that
there is no longer such an estate in existence in West Virginia. If
the issue in the principal case were presented for adjudication in
this jurisdiction, it would seem that the failure to meet the unity
of interest would destroy the rights of survivorship, as it certainly
would have under the common law rule. T=ANY,Ra-Am P opxiuy
§ 283 (new abr. ed. 1940); 48 C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 3 (1947).
The resulting estates of a tenancy in common are inheritable,
therefore P in the principal case could claim the land and defeat
the supposed survivorship in the remaining tenants. Since the
courts will expend great effort to give full effect to the creating
instrument, it is likely that this grant could be given effect by an
interpretation that would make all the grantees life tenants with
remainder to the survivor.
The above conclusion is not meant to represent a de fide
pronouncement of the law on this matter in West Virginia, for
there appear to be some questions on this matter as yet not clarified
by our court. There is at least a possibility that the West Virginia
court may decide that a grant or devise "to A and B with rights of
survivorship" would create a tenancy in common with rights of
survivorship annexed thereto. Other jurisdictions have held that
such an estate may be created. Dover Co-Operative Bank v.
Tobids Estate, 86 N.H. 209, 166 Atl. 247 (1933).
If the language "to A and B, and to the survivor of them"
would create a tenancy in common with rights of survivorship in
this jurisdiction, what is the effect of the survivorship feature? A
serious problem arises in determining if the incident of survivorship under such a grant is at all destructible. In a common law
joint tenancy, the right of survivorship could be destroyed easily
by a conveyance to a third party. This conveyance destroyed the
unities and reduced the interest conveyed to a tenancy in common
on which no right of survivorship was incumbent. 2 MINoR, RAr.
PnoPmETY § 849 (2d ed. 1928). Could the same method destroy
the survivorship annexed to a tenancy in common? Since there are
no unities attendant to such an estate, it is difficult to see how the
same rule could be logically applied. If this mongrel estate is to
be recognized and given effect, the result is a non-technical joint
tenancy with an indestructible right of survivorship. It seems
preferable to avoid such violence to the common law estates when
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the satme result may be reached by a grant or devise "to A and B
for life, remainder to the survivor."
Under the present West Virginia law a joint tenancy may
still be created replete with all the common law incidents, and
it wotdd appear that the holding in the principal case would be
contrary had that case arisen in this jurisdiction. Whether a tenancy in common with rights of survivorship may be created in
this jurisdiction would seem to be a question in need of an answer.
W. E. M.
ABSTRACTS
EviDENCE-ES IPsA LoQurnru-"MoDmu, VIEw" APPriED.-P,
while doing her marketing, selected a carton of D's product and placed
it in her push cart. Almost immediately she was struck by flying glass
from an exploding bottle of D's product which remained upon the
shelf and was not touched by P. The products had been delivered
to the market and placed upon the shelf by D's employee. There
was no attempt made to prove that the bottle was mishandled by
persons other than D's employees. Held, that an inference of negligence arose from the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule,
although actual control of the bottle had passed from D. Ferrell v.
Royal Crown Bottling Co., 109 S.E.2d 489 (W. Va. 1959).
Generally it may be stated that it is necessary to prove three
elements before the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable: (1)
Plaintiff must prove that he was without fault, (2) That he was
injured by an instrumentality which was within the exclusive control
of the defendant, (8) That the accident would not have happened
in the ordinary course of events if the defendant had used due care.
Pope v. Edward M. Rude CarrierCorp., 138 W. Va. 218, 75 S.E.2d
584 (1953).
The principal case marks the first time West Virginia has applied the doctrine to bottle explosion cases when the defendant was
not in exclusive control of the bottle at the time of the accident.
The principal case followed the so-called "modem view" to
the effect that exclusive control by the defendant is not necessary
as long as the plaintiff can prove that no person was probably negligent in handling the instrumentality subsequent to its leaving defendant's control.
It is believed that the result of the principal case is just, but
perhaps the court should require the plaintiff to prove more than
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